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Professor Stewart's article is designed to convince us that the modern
regulatory state can be made consistent with the requirements of liber-
alism. Given this objective, it seems odd that he defines liberalism in a
way that makes any kind of governmental activity indefensible. Liber-
alism, he claims, requires the government insofar as it can, consistent with
its basic functions, to be neutral regarding its citizens' value choices; gov-
ernmental action, including regulation, must avoid, to the extent possible,
choosing among its citizens' different "conceptions of the good." 1 Yet if
liberalism actually requires this kind of government value neutrality, then
neither the United States nor any other country has had, or could ever
have, a liberal government. Part I of this Comment will demonstrate that
no government action can be value neutral. All of Professor Stewart's ef-
forts to portray the regulatory state as value neutral can disguise, but can-
not eliminate, governmental value choices.
Many defenders of liberalism would respond to such an attack on the
ideal of neutrality simply by denying that liberalism necessarily renders
government impotent to make value choices and implement social change.'
Bentham, for example, was a liberal thinker not afraid to use government
power to implement certain values at the expense of others.' But this kind
of defense of liberalism seems unacceptable to Professor Stewart. For him
governmental activity-in particular, governmental regulation-can be
justified only if it does not require the government to use its coercive pow-
ers "in a partisan manner to advance some citizens' particular conception
of the good.' 4 In Part II of this Comment, I speculate on the reasons for
Professor Stewart's decision to ground governmental regulatory power on
the implausible claim that it can be made consistent with the ideal of a
neutral government. I argue that he has attempted to justify the welfare
state in these terms in order to persuade those on the Right who share his
ideal of governmental neutrality to support governmental regulation. By
framing his article in this way, however, he has neglected even to address
t" Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1. Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J.
1537, 1539 (1983).
2. See J. DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 15 (1963).
3. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
(Anchor ed. 1963).
4. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1540.
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the concerns of other critics of the regulatory state-those on the Left who
criticize the welfare state not for its advocacy of values but for the way in
which those value judgments are made.
I
In his article, Professor Stewart postulates governmental neutrality as
an essential ingredient of liberalism. Although he rejects the position that
liberalism requires moral skepticism and thereby allows the state to make
some value choices, he restricts these choices to those that appear neutral
and noncontroversial.' He assigns the liberal state only such tasks as in-
stilling "respect for the moral values of citizens' rights" and nurturing
"competing conceptions of the good."' These values seem either to en-
hance every individual's ability to pursue her own goals or, at worst, to
thwart her desires only in nonproblematic ways (no crime allowed).7
Moreover, Professor Stewart insists that government has no business pre-
ferring some of its citizens to others by (for example) redistributing pri-
vate wealth.8 The only governmental position that appears to be accept-
able is its pursuit either of values common to everyone or of no specific
values at all. Professor Stewart thus advocates governmental reliance on
what he calls "non-commodity values" on the ground that such values are
needed to prevent governmental favoritism: A government that pursues
only commodity values would favor some of its citizens' values over others.
Professor Stewart even defines and defends his four specific non-commod-
ity values in wholly apolitical terms; each value appears not to advance
any particular vision of the good and to make the government neutral
regarding its citizens' basic choices in life.'
Professor Stewart's insistence on governmental neutrality is not-and
could not be-based on an historical analysis of American government as
a passive observer in the creation of American Society. Louis Hartz, who
most dramatically sought to label America as the quintessential liberal
society,1" demonstrated in his historical work the active effort by govern-
5. Id. at 1540.
6. Id. at 1539. The neutral impact of this kind of state action can be contrasted with government
action justified by an appeal to the public interest. Such an appeal is more threatening because it can
so readily be used to conceal the government's adoption of one set of private values at the expense of
another. Indeed, liberal criticism of the concept of the public good is as old as the works of Locke and
Hume. J. LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in 5 WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 43-45 (London,
1824); D. Hume, That Politics May be Reduced to a Science, in HUME'S MORAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 295 (H. Aiken ed. 1948).
7. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1540-41.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1567-69. For a description of Professor Stewart's "non-commodity" values, see infra
1595-96.
10. L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955).
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ment from the time of the American Revolution onwards to foster some
values at the expense of others.' Hartz's account, which focuses on the
involvement of state and local government in fostering specific commercial
ventures, ends in 1860, but it could easily be updated with hundreds of
later examples. Such examples range from the municipal financing of rail-
roads later in the nineteenth century12 to Detroit's recent condemnation of
the Poletown neighborhood to provide a plant site for General Motors."
The picture is no different at the national level. Both Hamilton and Jef-
ferson sought to foster a liberal society, as did the judges and other gov-
ernment officials who regularly used governmental power to deter the for-
mation of labor unions. 4 Professor Stewart does not dispute this
history-indeed, he cites some of it himself."
Professor Stewart's insistence on the link between neutrality and liber-
alism rests not on an historical analysis but on his unusual reading of
major liberal thinkers. John Stuart Mill can serve as an example. Mill
assigned to government an active role in the creation of the values of its
citizens. Believing that "all the follies, all the vices, all the negligences,
indolences, and supineness of mankind"'" could destroy the foundation of
the social order, Mill argued that the "most important point of excellence
which any form of government can possess is to promote the virtue and
intelligence of the people themselves."' 7 Far from thinking, as did Kant,
that a liberal constitution could permit even a population of devils to co-
operate peacefully,' Mill sought, as did Aristotle, to have the government
act affirmatively to create the kind of citizenry necessary to perpetuate a
just society." Moreover, while conceding in his Principles of Political
Economy that a laissez-faire government was the general rule, Mill pro-
pounded a substantial list of "exceptions" that required a liberal govern-
ment to adopt an extensive positive program.20 For example, he recog-
11. L. HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1860, at 3
(1948); see also 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH (1947) (same proposition in context
of Massachusetts).
12. See Fairman, Reconstruction and Reform 1864-1888, in 6 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1010-17 (P. Freund ed. 1971).
13. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
14. See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921); Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the
Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-41, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265,
269-70 (1978).
15. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1543-45.
16. J. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 22 (C. Shields ed. 1958) (1st
ed. London 1848).
17. Id. at 25.
18. I. KANT, Perpetual Peace, A Philosophical Sketch, in KANT'S POLITICAL WRITINGS 112-13
(H. Reiss ed. 1970).
19. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 173-205 (H. Rackham trans. 1959); Barker, Introduction to ARIS-
TOTLE, POLITICS (E. Barker trans. 1946).
20. 2 J. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 953-980 (W. Asley ed. 1976) (1st ed.
London 1848).
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nized that the rules of property and contract could not be derived simply
from the wishes of private individuals; they had to be the product of pub-
lic policy. Government had to choose a position on issues such as the en-
forceability of wage contracts with low salaries, or of contracts, even for
marriage, that purported to last in perpetuity.21 Furthermore, in addition
to a governmental role in education, Mill urged close governmental super-
vision of corporations and of utility companies2" and a broader govern-
ment welfare program than the one that now exists in the United States.23
Such a government agenda is not easily understood as being neutral
regarding individual conceptions of the good. Yet Professor Stewart tries
to make this kind of governmental action consistent with neutrality by
advancing the following liberal canon: The principle of neutrality does not
bar government activity as long as such activity is limited to "securing
individuals' private and political liberties, underwriting private agree-
ments and associations, and providing other nurturing social services (such
as education) and other collective goods (such as healthy environments). ' 4
The key concepts in this proposition are "rights" and "appropriate back-
ground conditions." By manipulating these two concepts, Professor Stew-
art is able to present all governmental value choices as merely exercises of
neutrality.
Consider first the concept of "rights." Professor Stewart suggests that
the welfare state can be considered value neutral because there might be a
21.
Governments do not limit their concern with contracts to a simple enforcement. They take
upon themselves to determine what contracts are fit to be enforced. It is not enough that one
person, not being either cheated or compelled, makes a promise to another. There are promises
by which it is not for the public good that persons should have the power of binding them-
selves. To say nothing of engagements to do something contrary to law, there are engagements
which the law refuses to enforce, for reasons connected with the interest of the promiser, or
with the general policy of the state. A contract by which a person sells himself to another as a
slave, would be declared void by the tribunals of this and of most other european countries.
There are few nations whose laws enforce a contract for what is looked upon as prostitution,
or any matrimonial engagement of which the conditions vary in any respect from those which
the law has thought fit to prescribe. But when once it is admitted that there are any engage-
ments which for reasons of expediency the law ought not to enforce, the same question is
necessarily opened with respect to all engagements. Whether, for example, the law should
enforce a contract to labour, when the wages are too low, or the hours of work too severe:
whether it should enforce a contract by which a person binds himself to remain, for more than
a very limited period, in the service of a given individual: whether a contract of marriage,
entered into for life, should continue to be enforced against the deliberate will of the persons,
or of either of the persons, who entered into it. Every question which can possibly arise as to
the policy of contracts, and of the relations which they establish among human beings, is a
question for the legislator; and one which he cannot escape from considering, and in some way
or other deciding.
Id. at 389; see also id. at 386-90, 518, 585-87.
22. Id. at 582-85.
23. Id. at 590.
24. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1539.
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right to a minimum income.2 5 C. B. MacPherson relies on a similar kind
of invention of rights to reach a more radical position: He portrays demo-
cratic socialism as simply an outgrowth of the need to protect liberal prop-
erty rights.2" Professor MacPherson accomplishes this result by redefining
property rights to include "the right to share in political power, and, even
beyond that, a right to a kind of society or set of power relations which
will enable the individual to live a fully human life."2 Since neither Pro-
fessor Stewart nor Professor MacPherson feels bound by current law in
his definition of rights, each has unlimited scope to label any governmen-
tal value choice a protection of a "right" and thus a mere extension of
liberal neutrality.
But surely it has been clear since Wesley Hohfeld and Robert Hale
that every creation and interpretation of a right is itself a value choice.28
Even if property rights were derived from natural law and not from the
state, the interpretation of what a property right is can never be value
neutral. Whether a court allows Alice to use her land in a way that blocks
the sunlight that operates Barbara's adjacent solar heating system or, al-
ternatively, grants Barbara an easement over Alice's land so that Barbara
can warm her house, the court's interpretation of property rights is a
value choice. 29 As long as government is to be the source of interpretation
and enforcement of rights-and every liberal thinker assigns it that
task 30-government can never be value neutral. The concept of rights, far
from solving the problem of government value neutrality, simply restates
it: No liberal government can be neutral because it exercises the power to
decide what rights are.
3 1
Professor Stewart's second concept-that the liberal state can properly
act to create the "background conditions" that allow each person to pur-
sue his own vision of the good-similarly allows government to make
25. Id. at 1568.
26. C. MACPHERSON, A Political Theory of Property, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RE-
TRIEVAL 120 (1973).
27. Id. at 136.
28. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J.
710 (1917); Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political" and "Economic" Compulsion, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 149 (1935); Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,
38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923). For an excellent discussion of the importance of Hohfeld's insights, see
Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS.
L. REV. 975 (1982).
29. This hypothetical is based on Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982) in which the
Wisconsin Supreme Court overturned the lower court's determination that the plaintiff had failed to
state a claim.
30. Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205, 258-61,
294-300, 354-62 (1979).
31. In one part of his essay, Professor Stewart seems to recognize that value choices are involved
in assigning rights in a modern regulatory context; he therefore rejects any reliance on the concept of
rights for most of current regulatory decisionmaking. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1557-60. But the same
element of choice is equally present in those situations in which he relies on a rights analysis.
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value choices under the guise of neutrality. Professor Stewart, following
Mill, argues that an adequate conception of liberalism must stress the im-
portance of equipping and encouraging people to examine their own ideas
critically, providing them the means to pursue the goals thus developed,
inviting them to engage actively in the collective management of their
common affairs, and promoting diversity of cultures and political views.
He labels these goals "non-commodity values," and he defends them on
the ground that they are background conditions necessary for free individ-
ual choice. Liberalism, as Stewart presents it, seems part of the classical
republican or civic virtue tradition within Western political thought.
32
Professor Stewart fails to recognize, however, that almost any govern-
mental action can be defended on the ground that it is designed to create
these background conditions. Once one accepts the impact of social reality
on the formation of ideas, 3 all of social life can be understood as affecting
a person's ability to choose her own conception of the good. Accordingly,
all of social life is open to reconstruction under the guise of presenting a
better opportunity for individual choice. Professor Stewart recognizes that
a policy promoting some of these values affects the nature of individual
choice, 4 but he neglects to add that al governmental action-including its
support of the market economy itself-has the same effect. But surely the
government's creation of a society that affects the nature of individual
choice is not neutral; it is instead, as Aristotle claimed, the very essence of
politics.3 5
II
I hope that enough has now been said to show that Professor Stewart,
far from making government neutral, has simply chosen to camouflage his
value choices in the language of rights and of background conditions that
enhance the opportunity for individual choice. The interesting question as
far as I am concerned is why he feels the need for this camouflage. My
own guess is that Professor Stewart seeks to present his value choices as
being neutral because he is more of an Eisenhower Republican than he is
a classical republican.
The characteristic feature of an Eisenhower Republican, I believe, is
his conviction that the arguments he must confront to justify his politics
32. For a general treatment of the tradition from the era of Machiavelli, see J. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975).
33. The nature of this impact is analyzed in classic works dealing with the sociology of
knowledge. See, e.g., K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (1936); P. BERGER & T. LUCKMAN,
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1967).
34. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1568-69.
35. ARISTOTLE, supra note 19.
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come from the Right. He sees himself as a (relative) progressive and fears
that the Right might force him out of the Republican party. The viability
of his progressive stance depends on his ability to convince the powerful,
even persuasive, voices of the Right of his legitimacy. He therefore uses
the language of the Right, seeking to show that a proper reading of even
that language allows him to be an appropriate representative of their com-
mon cause.
This stance, it seems to me, pervades Professor Stewart's Article. He
adopts the right-wing goal of a valueless, passive government-one that
exists only to let private interests pursue their objectives-and tries to
show that, even in these terms, the regulatory state can be justified. He
seeks to persuade us that even a liberal of a Lockean persuasion would
today be a regulator. In pursuing this effort, all of his arguments are
designed to convince the Right that he is more neutral than it is. For
example, he spends a good deal of time criticizing the absolutely ridicu-
lous position that the only values worthy of respect are those that are
reflected in market transactions. This is a position advanced only by a
small, right-wing fringe, if by anyone. Now it should be said that Profes-
sor Stewart's arguments against this right-wing fringe, as far as they go,
are good ones. The imposition of a market-value approach is the "pater-
nalistic" imposition of one set of values at the expense of others.38 The
"enforcement-of-private-deals" theory of regulation is indeterminate; con-
tract law (as John Stuart Mill well recognized) has always had to decide
which deals should be enforced and which should not.37 The appeal to
efficiency in administrative law is subject to a now well-developed critique
of law-and-economics that has been articulated in other contexts. Profes-
sor Stewart, in short, succeeds in demonstrating that conceptions of regu-
lation normally embraced by the Right do not accomplish their avowed
end of promoting government neutrality. The problem is that insistence
on appealing to the Right traps him into an equally unpersuasive reliance
on neutrality and prevents him from advancing the cause of so-called non-
commodity values on their own merits.
Indeed, by concentrating only on the arguments of the Right, Professor
Stewart never feels compelled even to address those of us who think that
government neutrality is a chimera, and for whom the issue of govern-
mental legitimacy is not whether the government should pursue values but
from where these values should come. In particular, he never feels called
upon to respond to those on the Left who seek to make the values Profes-
sor Stewart is espousing-the values of civic virtue associated with the
36. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1540 n.12.
37. Id. at 1551-52; see supra note 21.
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classical republican tradition-the basis of public policymaking.38 This
does not mean simply making the classical republican tradition one factor
among the many that should be taken into account in a hierarchical deci-
sionmaking process that purports to be neutral. It means transforming the
ideal of civic virtue into a way of establishing and justifying value choices
through active democratic participation in the governmental decisionmak-
ing process. Many who criticize the welfare state from the Left, in short,
like many civic humanists before them, see civic virtue as the only source
of values we have in a world in which value choices are up for grabs.3 '
It is true, of course, that one of the points of Professor Stewart's Article
is to advance the cause of classical republicanism. He speaks articulately
about the importance of civic virtue, about the values generated by small-
scale associations like town meetings and religious and fraternal socie-
ties.40 Indeed, he defends civic virtue against the advocates of the market
and, to this extent, he fits right into the classical republican tradition. The
problem is that he seeks to defend classical republicanism by fostering the
regulatory state, not by fundamentally restructuring the decisionmaking
process. Indeed, at the end of his Article, he seeks to persuade us that, by
some synthesis, a combination of judicial review, bureaucratic specializa-
tion, electoral representation in the legislature and carefully devised efforts
at decentralization might produce a neutral government, civic virtue, a
free market, and the regulatory state. 1 It will not be easy, of course, and
we could fail; but careful, judicious revision of the status quo is the best
course to follow. It is at this point that Professor Stewart reappears as an
Eisenhower Republican rather than a classical republican.
Now, to be fair, I should indicate more specifically what a classical
republican criticism of Professor Stewart's position might be.4 ' This I
shall now attempt to do, focusing on the broadcasting and environmental
issues on which Professor Stewart concentrates. Beginning first with the
issue of broadcasting, decentralization of program content to the local
community is, as Professor Stewart suggests, a central goal. 8 Moreover,
he is right to suggest that cable technology could be a way to open up the
38. See, e.g., Pitkin & Shumer, On Participation, 2 DEMOCRACY 43 (1982); J. GAVENTA, POWER
AND POWERLESSNESS (1980); L. GOODWYN, THE POPULIST MOMENT (1978). This is my own posi-
tion. See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1057 (1980).
39. See J. POCOCK, supra note 32, at 211-18. For general analyses of how values must be created
in the modem world, see A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE
MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).
40. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1569.
41. Id. at 1587-89.
42. Note that I am not saying what the classical republican stance on these issues is-there is no
such thing. I seek only to indicate one such possible stance, one that gives an indication of the kind of
argument from the Left that Professor Stewart never feels obliged to address.
43. Id. at 1574.
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possibility of locally controlled programming. 4 But decentralization
would not promote civic virtue if each local broadcaster, whether on free
or cable TV, were simply a hierarchically organized corporation that re-
lated to its community only through the shadow market of the Nielsen
ratings. Promotion of classical republican values requires involving the
greatest possible number of people in the process of making programming
decisions.
Such involvement, first of all, is fostered by a participatory rather than
a hierarchical form of broadcasting organization. Curiously, when Profes-
sor Stewart talks of the value of civic virtue, he refers only to town meet-
ings and fraternal organizations and not to one's life at work.45 But since
our daily work (together with our family life) occupies most of our time,
the participatory values that are the hallmark of the civic virtue tradition
must be part of our work life if they are actually to transform our human
experience. Moreover, these organizations should be structured to allow
television consumers as well as producers to participate in programming
decisions and to ensure that this participation is not just through a market
nexus, but through joint discussion and planning. We now seriously lack
organizational forms that permit such participation; it will take imagina-
tion and radical change to create them. But different approaches can be
tried to see how a consumer voice can most effectively be heard. Stations
could be consumer cooperatives whose members could plan the appropri-
ate variety of programming; discussion in a town meeting might be pro-
ductive in communities of an appropriate size; a municipally-owned sta-
tion might be organized as a vehicle for mass participation; 48 sections of
the community interested in a particular form of programming could or-
ganize themselves to provide it.
The point of such initiatives is to involve the public in decisionmaking
to a sufficient degree that the very act of participation changes the way
individuals treat each other, the way they experience their lives-that is
the classical republican vision. The goal is to make programming come
out of the discourse of the community rather than have the community
discourse derive from commercial programming. If this kind of vision
could be realized, none of Professor Stewart's arguments for regulation
would justify perpetuating the regulatory state. Surely the FCC, chas-
tened by judicial review and executive branch intervention, is unnecessary
to promote civic virtue. The problem with regulation from a classical re-
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1569.
46. Approximately forty small cities now run cable television franchises themselves; Cleveland,
Ohio, Palo Alto, California, and Cambridge, Massachusetts have also been considering municipal
ownership. Varley, Cities as Operators, 86 TECHNOLOGY REV., Jan. 1983, at 57-58.
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publican perspective is not that it prefers some values over others-that's
okay-but that these values derive from a centralized elite and not from
active involvement of citizens with each other.
Turning to the issue of environmental controls, Professor Stewart
recognizes that "interstate mobility of products, capital, and labor" cur-
rently undermines local efforts to improve environmental quality.47 Since
a corporation can threaten a community that seeks to impose vigorous
clean air standards with leaving town, local communities often compete
not for strict environmental controls but for lax ones, preferring survival
with smog to economic catastrophe. Professor Stewart accepts this mobil-
ity as a given. He fails, however, to be sufficiently concerned with the
identity of the people who make the mobility decisions and with the condi-
tions under which they are made. From a classical republican perspective,
as I have argued elsewhere,4" political and economic decentralization must
go hand-in-hand: There can be no meaningfully decentralized decision-
making about environmental matters as long as decisions about capital
mobility are centralized. Moreover, local communities must be empowered
to make environmental decisions. Currently, even those communities now
willing to pay the economic price of environmental safety are often pre-
vented by law from imposing environmental controls.49
Of course, it would be foolish simply to decentralize decisionmaking
overnight to communities as they are currently organized. That would
produce chaos because there are no effective mechanisms in place for
inter-community discussion and cooperation. Competition for environmen-
tal protectionism would be no better than competition for environmental
degradation. We need an effective way for national economic and environ-
mental policy to be built together from the ground up, starting with local
community decisionmaking and building toward inter-community and
inter-state cooperation. A classical republican agenda would seek to create
such mechanisms. If such participation and cooperation could be achieved,
I doubt that Professor Stewart's arguments for the regulatory state would
be considered a better way of linking the needs for civic virtue, environ-
mental quality and economic vitality.
This discussion of broadcasting and environmental policy is not
designed to set a classical republican agenda for the future. The point
instead is to underscore the ideological basis of Professor Stewart's argu-
47. Stewart, supra note 1, at 1546.
48. See Frug, supra note 38, at 1126-28.
49. Some common reasons for this powerlessness include pre-emption and lack of home-rule au-
thority; the commerce clause could provide additional restraints if needed. Stablex Corp. v. Town of
Hooksett, 122 N.H. 1091, 456 A.2d 94 (1982); . Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
456 (1981) (upholding Minnesota statute barring certain nonrefundable containers against equal pro-
tection and commerce clause challenges).
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ments for neutrality. He speaks only to those on the Right who believe
that there can be-indeed must be-such a thing as governmental neutral-
ity, and seeks to convince them of his own commitment to neutrality. Like
the architects of the regulatory state, he finds the necessary neutrality in
governance by proposing an amalgamation of corporate, administrative
and judicial leaders. While these bureaucratic leaders cannot be trusted
not to impose their own values on American society, they can adequately
"balance" the ideals of civic virtue with those of the market to make their
policies reflect value neutrality. Professor Stewart, however, ought to ad-
dress those of us who freely admit that government decisionmaking is
based on value choices and who argue that values should come from polit-
ical participation rather than from regulatory decisionmakers. The pur-
pose of this participation is not just to legitimate political decisionmaking.
Instead, its purpose is to create a different kind of world, a different way
of living our lives. "Only as a citizen," the classical republican tradition
suggests, "as [a] political animal involved in a vivere civile with his fel-
lows [can an individual] fulfill his nature, achieve virtue, and find his
world rational." 50
50. J. POCOCK, supra note 32, at 114.
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